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This study takes a step toward reconceptualizing the process of financialization, 
the reorientation of the US economy toward financial services that scholars view 
as a product of the 1970s economic shocks and subsequent regulatory 
liberalization. Instead, I argue that financialization was equally dependent on 
the gradual development of new financial technologies and business practices 
within the political and regulatory environment of the early postwar era. I do so 
by examining a cohort of small US banks, which in the early 1950s began 
experimenting with a novel form of consumer credit, the charge account credit 
service. These plans allowed consumers to shop at a variety of local merchants 
using a single bank charge card. Bankers, though, developed charge account 
plans not as a conduit for consumer lending, but as a business service, which 
enabled their small merchant customers to compete with the credit plans offered 
by expanding department stores. In this way, charge account banking conformed 
with the 1950s-political economy of finance, where commercial bankers 
primarily lent to businesses and were still wary of consumer credit. Although 
they operated differently than the credit cards we know today, charge account 
banking plans were still a necessary first step toward this later financial 
technology, paving the way for commercial bankers to invest in unsecured card-








In the spring of 1955, G. L. Toole, cashier for the Upper Darby National Bank in 
suburban Philadelphia, published a pair of articles in the American Banker newspaper detailing 
his bank’s successful experience developing and operating a charge account credit service—
forerunner to our modern credit card. The program allowed consumers to shop at a variety of 
local merchants using a single, bank-sponsored credit plan, which they repaid at the end of each 
month. The plan was called Charge-Rite. “Sure, the name can be called corny,” Toole conceded, 
“but it refers to the service it represents, is short, phonetic, and kind of easy to remember.” 
Toole’s bank began Charge-Rite in 1953, and by early 1955 the bank had processed more than 
$750,000 in local credit transactions. After enduring high start-up costs, Charge-Rite was 
generating modest profits, and the future looked bright. “At my bank,” Toole explained, “We 
believe charge account banking will develop into one of the most successful of our services.” 
Toole was not alone. After detailing the success of charge account banking plans across the 
country, American Banker associate editor Otto C. Lorenz gushed in November, “where else 
could the banker invest…and get such handsome returns in dollars, not to mention good will?”1 
The charge account plans described by Toole and praised by Lorenz were, at first glance, 
an unlikely innovation for bankers to pursue during the early-postwar decades. In the wake of 
the Great Depression and the New Deal-era banking reforms that followed, the American 
commercial banking industry was structurally and culturally predisposed toward a custodial 
obsession with safety, not an entrepreneurial spirit of risk-taking. Most commercial bankers, 
whose primary function was meeting the financial needs of businesses, were deeply suspicious 
of direct consumer lending. When bankers did lend to consumers in the 1950s, they did so for 
                                                          
1 G.L. Toole, “Development and Progress of A Bank Charge Account Service: Part I,” American Banker (April 28, 
1955), 7; G.L. Toole, “Development and Progress of A Bank Charge Account Service: Part II,” American Banker (May 
16, 1955), 6; Otto C. Lorenz, “21 Charge Account Bankers Show Profits for 3rd Quarter—Only Nine Were Out of Red 
Year Ago,” American Banker (November 30, 1955), 8; Otto C. Lorenz, “5 More Banks Enter Charge Account Profit 
Column,” American Banker (August 25, 1959), 10; Brochure, Upper Darby National Bank, “Upper Darby National 





purchases with concrete collateral, like automobiles and appliances; for those with firm 
government guarantees, like Federal Housing Administration Title I loans; or, in the best 
circumstances, both. They did not finance casual shopping. The cautious conservatism exhibited 
by most commercial bankers has, in turn, come to define their industry in the view of later 
scholars, who either lament the fall from this idyll of postwar stability or mock postwar bankers 
for drumming up consumer accounts with free toasters and steak knives.2 
Yet, for a small cohort of bankers, the industry’s marble-pillared traditionalism was too 
confining. Consumption was self-evidently the pulsing heart of the postwar economy. Financial 
institutions that catered to consumers, like credit unions and savings & loans, were growing 
quickly at commercial banking’s expense. If commercial banks wanted a part of this future, self-
described “progressive” bankers like Toole believed, they would need to shake the industry’s 
stodginess and find innovative ways to serve consumer markets.3  
Scholars need to better understand this history of early-postwar financial innovation. 
Historians and other scholars focus too much attention on the 1970s as a moment of rupture, 
when the forces of untamed inflation, technological change, and political deregulation combined 
to rapidly undermine the long financial stability of the postwar decades.4 Instead, the emergence 
of these early bank cards demonstrates that from the beginning of the postwar years, 
entrepreneurial bankers pursued opportunities to serve customers beyond the strict confines of 
the era’s financial-regulatory system, and in doing so put constant pressure on the boundaries of 
that system. 
This is not to say that Toole and his peers were bent on the destruction of the New-Deal 
banking reforms. Just the opposite. Even as bankers pursued financial innovation in the early 
                                                          
2 Calomiris and Haber, Fragile By Design, especially chapter 6; Cooper and Fraser, Banking Deregulation. 
3 Cohen, A Consumer’s Republic; Federal Reserve, Consumer Installment Credit, 37; Commission on Money and 
Credit, Money and Credit, 155. 
4 For scholars who characterize the 1970s as a moment of rupture, see: Krippner, Capitalizing on Crisis; Schulman, 
The Seventies; Judith Stein, Pivotal Decade. Credit historians have traced continuous credit innovation to the turn-
of-the-twentieth century, but largely view the early postwar decades as a period where practices inculcated by the 
New Deal remained stable as overall credit outstanding grew (Olegario, Engine of Enterprise, chapter 6; Hyman, 




postwar years, they remained constrained by the era’s regulatory barriers and the habits of 
thought these barriers encouraged.5 Specifically, although bankers were eager to facilitate 
consumption, they could not yet imagine marketing their new credit products directly to 
consumers. Instead, the postwar political and regulatory structure led charge account bankers 
toward a set of business strategies focused on retailers not consumers, and toward an inherently 
antimonopoly politics that was pro-small business rather than being pro-consumerism.6 Charge 
account banking was a business service, designed to help small retailers compete with the credit 
practices—and overcome the market power—of expanding department stores. Bankers used the 
plans to deepen business relationships with merchants, who bore the costs of charge account 
plans, while keeping the primarily female consumers who used the plans at arms-length. The 
political economy of banking, which sharply limited individual banks’ geographic markets, also 
allowed charge account bankers to form a collaborative innovation community, since their plans 
did not directly compete. As these firms worked together to achieve profitability through the 
1950s, they adopted many of the features that would later define our modern credit card 
systems, and in doing pushed the banking industry to embrace unsecured consumer lending. 
Scholars of postwar financial innovation have dismissed or ignored charge account 
banking plans and other product innovations pursued by commercial bankers in the 1950s, 
looking elsewhere for the origins of our modern consumer credit systems. With their merchant—
rather than consumer—focus, charge account banking plans certainly looked different than the 
credit card programs that firms, like Bank of America, would later develop. Nevertheless, charge 
                                                          
5 Another unstudied innovation pursed by banks in this period was check-credit. Check-credit plans built on existing 
check-clearing infrastructure, allowing consumers to write checks against a revolving line of credit. By the mid-1960s, 
many more banks offered check credit plans than credit card plans, because check credit plans required less capital 
investment and were similar to the checking products bankers already offered. The legal infrastructure of the check 
system, however, placed the fraud risk on merchants, limiting acceptance. Further, check-credit plans remained 
geographically confined, while bank card networks like BankAmericard and Master Charge expanded nationally. 
“FNB Boston Launches Check-Credit Plan: Personal Credit Via Punch-Card Checks,” American Banker (February 15, 
1955); Federal Reserve, Bank Credit-Card and Check-Credit Plans. 
6 My emphasis on postwar antimonopoly politics runs counter to Richard Hofstadter (“What Happened to the 
Antitrust Movement?,” in The Paranoid Style). Instead, I follow Richard John’s call for renewed focus on 




account banking was a first step toward the unsecured, direct consumer lending that would 
define the economy’s later drift toward unbridled finance, even if, in the 1950s, charge account 
bankers could not have imagined they were on that path.7 
 
Retail Credit and Banking Markets 
At the turn of the twentieth century, the application of mass-production techniques to 
consumer goods manufacturing and of efficient management techniques to retail marketing laid 
the groundwork for new credit technologies that would facilitate mass-purchasing. In this 
period, the country underwent what contemporaries termed a “credit revolution,” when firms 
developed new forms of retail credit to sell the bounty of goods to working- and middle-class 
consumers. The first was installment lending, where, for a reasonable down payment and a 
series of equal weekly or monthly payments over a fixed period thereafter, primarily working-
class consumers could buy expensive durable goods, such as radios and sewing machines, 
without paying the full cost upfront. The second credit innovation was the charge account, 
through which mostly elite consumers enjoyed a fixed line of credit that they repaid at the end of 
each month. Charge accounts were a high-status evolution of traditional retail book credit, 
scaled up and systematized in the nation’s bustling department stores. Both forms of credit 
helped ensure steady consumer demand, allowing, as historian Louis Hyman argues, 
“consumers to buy more, retailers to sell more, and manufacturers to make more, all at lower 
prices.”8  
The turn-of-the-century retail innovations created economic value for consumers, but 
they also threatened smaller, less efficient merchants, feeding a robust retail anti-monopolism. 
                                                          
7 Scholars who study postwar financial innovation and credit cards specifically largely view charge accounts as a failed 
path toward innovation. For scholars who take this view, see: Evans and Schmalensee, Paying With Plastic, 55-56; 
Hyman, Debtor Nation, 145-148; Mandell, The Credit Card Industry, 26-29; Stearns, Electronic Value Exchange, 18-
19; Olegario, Engine of Enterprise, 144-145; Wolters, “‘Carry Your Credit in Your Pocket,’” 322-324.  
8 Calder, Financing the American Dream, 19, 26-28, 111-208; Hyman, Debtor Nation, 10-12, 20-31; Howard, From 




In the 1910s and 1920s, small-town shopkeepers and corner merchants began organizing to 
combat the “destructive competition” of their new high-volume, low-price rivals. As Laura 
Phillips Sawyer and Marc Levinson have shown, small retailers won political allies with calls for 
“fair competition” in the 1920s and 1930s, culminating in New Deal legislation like the 
Robinson-Patman Act (1936) and the Miller-Tydings Act (1937), designed to curtail the market 
power of large retail firms. After World War II, anti-monopolism persisted as a powerful 
political and cultural force in the retail industry, as firms continued to negotiate the appropriate 
boundaries of market competition through the political process.9 
Similar antimonopoly impulses had long structured the American commercial banking 
industry, based not on the consequences of industrial production and managerial efficiency, but 
on older distrust of financial concentration. Before the Great Depression, most states enforced 
unit banking laws that restricted banks to a single banking office. By limiting the industry’s 
geographic scope, unit banking was meant to ensure that individual financial institutions were 
deeply tied to the communities they served and that credit was widely available for small 
proprietors. But this feature of the system was also its profound flaw. As the banking failures of 
the 1920s and 1930s clearly demonstrated, unit banking, wholly dependent on local economies, 
was systematically unstable. Instead of remaking this system during the New Deal, however, 
Congress preserved unit banking. It backstopped the industry with federal deposit insurance 
and imposed new limits on financial industry competition. Continued geographic restrictions, 
new price controls, and new limitations on services all worked in theoretical harmony to 
preserve a marketplace of small competitors by constraining destructive market forces.10 
New Deal reformers, however, were not unremitting enemies of financial innovation. To 
facilitate economic recovery, policymakers such as Rolf Nugent and Leon Henderson developed 
the Federal Housing Administration Title I loan program, which used federal insurance to 
                                                          
9 Sawyer, “California Fair Trade;” Levinson, The Great A&P. 
10 Perkins, “The Divorce of Commercial and Investment Banking;” Burns, The American Banking Community; 




incentivize bankers to make loans for home improvements, convincing many banks to finally 
adopt installment lending. This ounce of innovation, however, was soon balanced by a pound of 
conservatism. World War II, and the huge government debt it generated, allowed bankers to buy 
government bonds profitably on their own account. Reconversion, in turn, assured bankers safe 
opportunities in business investment. By the postwar era, conservatism reined.11 
While the war helped entrench bankers’ prudential caution, government intervention in 
retail credit markets during the war pressured retailers to innovate. In an effort to direct the 
nation’s financial resources toward wartime production and to constrain inflationary consumer 
spending, Franklin D. Roosevelt’s administration imposed federal limits on consumer credit use 
in April 1942. These wartime controls restricted both charge accounts, which consumers paid off 
every month, and installment lending, which consumers paid in fixed installments over time. 
They also required retailers to closely monitor their customers’ credit spending. Payment card 
technology—embossed metal plates integrated with mechanical accounting and billing 
systems—simplified compliance for large retailers. Retailers also experimented with new modes 
of granting credit to circumvent controls. Revolving credit, for example, gave consumers a fixed 
credit limit, like a charge account, but allowed them to pay over time, like installment credit. For 
many retailers, wartime credit controls linked revolving credit and payment card technologies, 
while charge accounts, which remained more widespread, also increasingly relied on card-based 
accounting and billing systems.12 
 After the war, large retailers gradually transitioned from fixed charge accounts to 
flexible revolving credit, a transition often reflected in practice but not terminology. Many 
retailer and bank “charge account” plans featured revolving credit, while some remained strictly 
charge accounts that had to be repaid monthly. Likewise, although the term “credit card” would 
come to be associated with revolving credit, in the 1950s its use was ambiguous (as in Figure 1). 
                                                          
11 Hyman, Debtor Nation, 100, 103; Commission on Money and Credit, Money and Credit; Cleveland and Huertas, 
Citibank, 213-218. 




What ultimately held these types of credit together was the status attached to them. “Charge 
accounts” were for respectable people; they were not the installment credit of the working-class. 
 
Figure 1 Ad for the Midland Shopper Credit Service, later the Midland Shoppers Charge Plan.  




With federal credit controls still in effect at the end of the war, credit quickly moved to 
the center of postwar retail politics. Retail trade groups, like the National Retail Dry Goods 
Association (NRDGA), fought federal policymakers’ efforts to make credit controls a permanent 
feature of postwar economic management. Instead, retail and financial industry groups 
portrayed consumer credit as a private path to prosperity in direct opposition to the statism of 
the New Deal. But as it forged a united front with other trade groups and beat back direct 
economic controls, the NRDGA also had to diffuse the tensions credit threatened to create 
within its own industry. For the large retailers that had invested in efficient but expensive credit 
systems during the war, the best way to maximize their investments was to promote credit 
heavily afterward. To forestall new political agitation against such destructive competition, 
throughout the late 1940s and early 1950s the retail trade press urged small merchants to 
likewise adopt charge accounts to drive sales volume. By doing so, small retailers could 
simultaneously counter the renewed growth of chain retailers, who sold goods at a discount and 
did not offer credit, and department stores, which made credit central to their postwar 
expansion.13   
Small retailers, however, recognized that prioritizing credit simply introduced one more 
business challenge that complicated their position vis-à-vis their larger, more efficient rivals. 
Credit was a strain on small merchants’ already limited capital and small retailers could not turn 
to secondary markets or government lending programs to mitigate their credit risks. Unlike 
installment sales contracts, which could be resold to finance companies, charge account credit 
and its revolving cousin were indeterminate and thus not resalable. For small merchants, the 
convenient credit offered by their larger competitors and promoted by their trade association 
smacked of unfair competition and excessive market power, and came as many of these small 
                                                          
13 Senate, Consumer Credit Control; Syd J. Hughes, “Credit Under Regimentation,” Credit World 39, no. 6 (March 
1951), 9-12; Henry H. Heimann, “Sound Credit: Our First Line of Defense,” Credit World 39, no. 11 (August 1951), 4-
7; Hyman, Debtor Nation, 100-127; Howard, Main Street to the Mall, 123; Samuel Feinberg, “Store Operations: From 




firms struggled to gain space in the nation’s new shopping centers and to compete against 
department stores’ new branch units. Small retailers continued to mobilize politically to address 
these perceived injustices, fueling an ongoing political critique, from both conservative and 
liberal antimonopoly tradition, of the dominance of big business in the postwar era.14  
Some small bankers, closely attuned to the business challenges facing their small 
merchant customers, were trying to puzzle out possible business solutions to retailers’ credit-
granting problem. Small firms in both industries recognized that retail credit was a permanent 
feature of the marketplace, and bankers who counted struggling small merchants among their 
customers saw an opportunity to help these firms meet the new pressures of postwar retailing. 
“As far back as 1946,” G. L. Toole recalled, “our top men were seeking a way to assist the many 
local merchants who sought help [meeting] the competition of credit buying offered by center 
city merchants.” The solution, for Upper Darby’s “top men” and other bankers, was not 
immediately obvious. Although New Deal credit programs had nudged bankers into consumer 
fields, like home improvement, automobile, and durable goods financing, these lines of business 
were still mediated by direct sales firms, such as auto dealers or appliance retailers. Most 
commercial bankers had little retail experience beyond making business loans to retailers.15  
 
The Origins of Charge Account Banking  
 As bankers and their small retail customers wrestled with the question of how to meet 
the credit competition of center city merchants and other large credit-granting firms in their 
local markets, two banks initiated charge account plans in the expanding suburbs of New York 
City, which would serve as the impetus and inspiration for charge account banking’s nascent 
                                                          
14 “Store Operations: Smaller Stores Given Methods To Meet Chains: Visual Selling, Close Check on Expenses, 
Promotional Ideas Suggested to Those Doing Under $300,000.,” Women’s Wear Daily (June 30, 1950), 1, 39; Senate, 
Shopping Centers; Levinson, The Great A&P, TK; Kovaleff, Business and Government During the Eisenhower 
Administration, 11.  
15 Toole, “Charge Account Service: Part I.” By December 31, 1955, 97 percent of commercial banks engaged in 
consumer lending, but these loans made up only 14 percent of their loan portfolios. Federal Reserve, Consumer 




expansion. The first was the brainchild of John C. Biggins, an executive at the Flatbush National 
Bank of Brooklyn. After the war, New York City’s downtown department stores began to build 
branches in Brooklyn, offering charge accounts and competing directly with Flatbush Bank’s 
merchant customers. Biggins’s retail customers needed to offer convenient credit too, but doing 
so was expensive and risky. “The number of merchants who have been knocked out of business 
by supplying their own credit is enormous,” Biggins explained. “Charg-It,” a plan for “providing 
the small storekeeper with a credit arrangement that wasn’t a losing proposition for everyone 
concerned,” was Biggins’ answer.16 In essence, Biggins hoped to consolidate the lending 
activities of small merchants within the bank, so that a customer could shop at a variety of local 
retailers using bank credit, while the bank would pay merchants for the goods purchased and 
assume the bookkeeping costs and credit risk.  
Charg-It got its first trial, not in Brooklyn, but in Bay Shore, New York, a growing 
bedroom community linked to New York City by the Long Island Rail Road. While Biggins was 
perfecting Charg-It, Flatbush Bank was acquired by the larger Manufacturer’s Trust.17 
Manufacturer’s executives considered implementing Biggins’s plan across New York City, but 
ultimately chose not to, perhaps because Charg-It would have competed with the charge account 
plans of the larger bank’s department store customers. Instead, Biggins tested his plan in the 
suburbs in partnership with the First National Bank and Trust of Bay Shore. The program was 
small; a 1946 ad listed 11 participating merchants clustered on Bay Shore’s Main Street. “Charg-
It will give you the advantages of a department store charge account in your favorite local 
stores,” one ad promised, offering new suburban residents an incentive to do their shopping in-
town, instead of downtown.18  
                                                          
16 “Bank Starts First Credit Plan,” Newsday, Aug. 16, 1946. 
17 Eventually Manufacturers Hannover, now part of J.P. Morgan Chase. 
18 Prior scholarly accounts of Biggins’s plan claim it operated within a four-block radius of the Flatbush bank, but I 
have found no contemporary evidence to substantiate these claims. First National had a long-standing correspondent 
relationship with Manufacturer’s Trust (though Biggins may also have licensed the program independently of his 
position with the bank). Advertisement, The First National Bank and Trust Co. of Bay Shore, Newsday (October 22, 




In Bay Shore, Biggins initiated what would become a common strategy for banks 
instituting charge account plans, uniting local merchants to keep consumers’ shopping dollars 
within the community. When Biggins relocated to the Paterson Savings and Trust Company in 
suburban New Jersey, he brought Charg-It with him. Paterson merchants also competed with 
New York department stores, as well as with new suburban shopping centers like the Paramus 
Mall. In Paterson, Charg-It offered retailers a “vital community service” by keeping business 
local. “You can shop in your own neighborhood,” a Paterson Savings ad promised. “Charg-It [at] 
stores and receive the same credit courtesy available [at] the biggest stores in the city.”19 
While Biggins designed Charg-It to help small retailers compete with department stores, 
the plan had a critical weakness: ultimately it was less convenient than department store charge 
accounts. By the late 1940s, most department stores had adopted charge-plates, embossed metal 
cards, which, as part of integrated accounting and billing systems, enabled department stores to 
monitor and control individuals’ credit purchases at their stores. For consumers, the card was a 
means of identification and the medium of credit. On the contrary, Charg-It combined a card, 
which identified the consumer, and credit scrip which were paper certificates equal to the 
consumer’s pre-established credit limit. Scrip was a powerful control device, because consumers 
could never use more credit that they had been granted and only received new scrip when they 
paid off their outstanding Charg-It balances. But scrip, which was only issued in denominations 
of $1 or more, was a source of considerable consumer annoyance, since purchases inevitably did 
not come out in round figures. And, as G. L. Toole, whose bank consciously chose not to adopt a 
scrip-based credit plan observed, “there is a certain stigma attached to the carrying of scrip.” 
Charge accounts were a marker of class status, and scrip was just not classy.20  
                                                          
19 Cohen, “From Town Center to Shopping Center;” C. Kenneth Fuller, “A Bank’s ‘Charg-It’ Plan for Merchants,” 
Burroughs Clearing House (November 1950), 28. 
20 “Charge It--With the Bank,” Business Week (September 23, 1950), 58, 60; Toole, “Charge Account Service: Part I ;” 




Historians credit Biggins with leading the banking industry’s early shift into retail 
lending, but his industry quickly rejected the scrip solution. To make charge account banking 
viable, bankers instead looked to emulate the credit practices of department stores. One 
alternative was the similarly named “Charge-It” plan, announced in May 1952 by Franklin 
National Bank, also of suburban Long Island. Charge-It, Franklin National executive Edward 
Donohue claimed, developed from a conference bank executives hosted to consider how the 
firm’s merchant customers could better promote their businesses. There, community retailers 
argued that their most pressing need was to offer charge account services. As they contemplated 
how to help these firms, Franklin executives decided that if department stores were the threat, 
they should also be the model. “In order to make this program completely acceptable to the 
ultimate consumer,” Donohue observed, “we could not change habits; we would have to emulate 
exactly the technique and methods of department stores.” Franklin National made the card both 
the form of identification and credit medium, so that consumers would experience charge 
account purchasing at their local merchant exactly as they would at a department store.21  
With merchants on board, the problem Franklin National executives faced was how to 
entice and enroll creditworthy consumers. In a model that later charge account programs would 
widely adopt, Franklin executives built Charge-It on established relationships between the 
bank’s idealized customer, “Mrs. Housewife,” and the merchants she patronized. Under the 
plan, Mrs. Housewife applied for a bank charge card through a participating merchant with 
which she already had a credit relationship. The bank performed its own credit check later, but 
by relying on its merchant partners to sign-up customers, the bank embedded Charge-It within 
existing relationships between merchants and consumers, relying on these established bonds of 
trust to anchor the program.  
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Assuming everything checked out, the bank issued Mrs. Housewife a charge card 
embossed with her husband’s name and their account number, and she could then shop as she 
would at a local department store. When wishing to make a purchase, she handed the retailer 
her card, and if the advertisements are any indication, proudly exclaimed, “Please Charge It!” 
The retailer, duly impressed, completed a sales slip with the details of the purchase and 
imprinted the embossed card on the slip, which Mrs. Housewife signed. If the purchase was 
above $10, or some similar pre-determined limit, the merchant also called the bank to confirm 
Mrs. Housewife’s account was in good standing. As far as Mrs. Housewife was concerned, the 
transaction ended there, and she could simply take her goods. Every month the bank 
consolidated Mrs. Housewife’s account, and mailed her a bill containing carbon copies of all her 
sales slips. She would pay her bill in full each month, without paying interest.22 
Behind Mrs. Housewife’s transaction was a second series of transfers between the 
merchant and the bank, which hid the mechanisms—and more importantly—costs of her charge 
account from view. At the end of the business day, Franklin National’s merchant-customers 
consolidated all their charge account sales slips and transferred them to the bank. The bank then 
credited each merchant’s account for the full value of all these purchases, less a fixed percentage 
called the merchant discount. For the Franklin National, the discount was 5 percent. So, if Mrs. 
Housewife bought a $10 pair of shoes, the bank paid the merchant $9.50, with the remaining 50 
cents accruing to the bank to cover the costs of issuing the credit and carrying the risk of lending 
to Mrs. Housewife.23 Merchants also often paid fees to join the charge account plan, to rent the 
imprinter that recorded the customer’s information on the sales slip, and to participate in 
advertising tie-ins with the bank.  
As Donohue’s invocation of “Mrs. Housewife” suggests, bankers designed their charge 
account plans to facilitate female-led, family consumption. Charge account bankers imagined 
                                                          
22 Toole, “Charge Account Service: Part II;” David C. Hopper, “’Easy Charge’ Credit Plan Proving Profitable for Jersey 
Bank, Aiding Other Departments,” American Banker (September 27, 1956), 5, 10; Cohen, Consumers’ Republic, 278. 




their market as white, female, and married. Toole’s customer was “Mrs. John Shopper;” other 
bankers preferred plain “Mrs. Shopper.” This new banking service, charge account 
advertisements suggested, made wifely tasks like family shopping and budgeting more 
convenient, consolidating small purchases into one monthly bill. They also emphasized safety. 
In the First National Bank of Kalamazoo advertisement (Figure 2), Mrs. Smith does “not like 
carrying all that cash around with me,” and feels that “a charge account...would be more 
convenient and a great deal safer.” Her husband approves, a necessary step since the family’s 
credit would be in his name (as in John L. Customer in Figure 1). In this way, charge account 
bankers promoted the wholesome abundance and familial safety that Elaine Tyler May argues 
was central to family life in the Cold War era, while their charge account products operated in 
distinct contrast to male modes of credit, like automobile loans and durable goods purchases.24 
                                                          
24 Charles H. Landrain, “Charge Accounts Offer Banks Chance to Provide Valuable Service, Landrain Informs 
Conference,” American Banker (June 16, 1959), 11; Otto C. Lorenz, “Will Revolving Check-Credit Vie with Charge-
Account Banking?” American Banker (January 26, 1959), 7; Toole, “Charge Account Service: Part I;” May, 
Homeward Bound. Typical applications asked first for the occupation of “Mr. or Miss,” with space for “Wife’s 
Occupation” below. Brochure, Upper Darby National Bank, “Upper Darby National Bank: Charge-Rite Revolving 
Credit Plan,” Box 1294, PDP; Advertisement, Florida National Bank, “A NEW Source of Revenue for Orlando 




Figure 2 Brochure for the 1st National Charge Account Service. 
Source: “First National Charge Account Service Shoppers Guide,” First National Bank and Trust 
of Kalamazoo Clipping File, Kalamazoo Public Library (ca. mid-1950s). 
 
Building a Collaborative Innovation Community 
When Charg-It and Charge-It emerged in the early 1950s, the business and banking 
press hailed the plans as an important new banking service, one which promised to aid small 




employed by Biggins and Donahue, Business Week, Banking, and other outlets portrayed charge 
account banking as a product with a politics, imbued with small-business anti-monopolism. 
Franklin National’s “Charge-It” plan could, “support private enterprise at the small retailer 
level” and even “stem the disappearance of the small store which finds it difficult to compete 
with the large units opening branches in suburban areas.” As charge account banking developed 
and spread, bankers held tightly to these narratives. Sharing their own origin stories at industry 
conferences and in the banking trade press throughout the 1950s, bankers inevitably repeated 
the politically-coded founding story first articulated by Franklin National’s Edward Donohue: 
banks initiated charge account plans to help their small merchant customers compete with 
department store credit plans. One Florida banker even compared his bank’s plan to the Small 
Business Investment Act (1958), because both provided direct aid to small retailers competing 
against the market power of larger firms.25  
The praise Charg-It and Charge-It received in the business and banking press was one of 
several converging currents which drove a wave of banks to initiate charge account plans in the 
early 1950s. First, the end of the Korean conflict and its associated federal credit controls cleared 
the way for a significant expansion in consumer borrowing. In this market, charge account 
plans, in addition to promoting anti-monopolistic altruism, promised to generate significant 
revenues—as high as 20 percent, American Banker estimated in October 1952. The vision of 
potential profits was further promoted by firms manufacturing credit processing equipment, 
such as Addressograph and Diebold, and by charge account bankers like Biggins and Donahue, 
whose banks were marketing franchise arrangements to prospective charge account bankers. 
Whether they signed with an established plan or developed one on their own, at least 91 banks 
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initiated charge account plans by the end of 1953, leading Donohue to declare confidently, 
“‘charge accounts for banks,’ is here to stay.”26 
Hidden by Donohue’s optimism were the impending difficulties each individual bank 
would face as they brought their new charge account plans to market. High equipment and 
supplies costs, difficulty enrolling merchants and consumers, inexperience managing retail 
credit accounts, and regulatory interference would all challenge firms as they sought to tailor 
charge account banking to the needs of their specific communities. Rather than confront these 
challenges alone, charge account bankers and their industry allies quickly formed informal and 
formal networks to promote charge account plans, determine and share best practices, and 
develop new profit-making strategies. Such cooperation was possible because, within the 
geographically segmented financial system, charge account bankers did not directly compete.27  
Leading the promotional campaign was American Banker editor Otto Lorenz, a veteran 
of the industry’s expansion into installment lending in the 1930s, who viewed charge account 
banking as the postwar generation’s next big innovation.28 Lorenz promoted charge account 
banking through multi-page quarterly reports in American Banker, which detailed volume, 
expense, and profit statistics as well as commentary on plan management provided by Lorenz 
and practicing charge account bankers. The sample budget below (Figure 3) is typical of the kind 
of material bankers could expect from Lorenz’s columns. Through his reports, Lorenz effectively 
constructed the industry, forging a community of practitioners—who he lovingly called his 
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“pioneers”—and giving them a virtual space to compete and test new ideas. He also sought to 
explain the new plans to uninitiated bankers in terms they could understand, relying on 
established banking concepts, like letters of credit and accounts receivable factoring, to link 
unfamiliar consumer credit with familiar banking practices.29  
 
 
Figure 3 Suggested First Year Charge Account Budget based on Biggins’s “Charg-It” plan. 
Source: American Banker, October 30, 1953. 
                                                          




Such explanations were necessary, because when Lorenz began his quarterly reports in 
June 1953, the methods and measures of charge account banking were entirely fluid. Lorenz and 
his readers worked to define what activities and expenses bankers needed to account for, and 
through these measures determine what elements would make the new programs viable and 
profitable.30 Was the size of a bank’s “trading area” a factor in charge account success?31 What 
was the best way to report delinquency data (so as not to scare off likely adopters)?32 How much 
of the bank’s overhead should the charge account program be accountable for? By reporting and 
analyzing the strategies used by exemplary performers and using such information to critique 
the practices of underperforming firms, Lorenz and his contributors crafted an ongoing 
proscriptive guide to charge account banking, one intended explicitly to entice more bankers to 
adopt the plans in their markets. 
Some skeptical bankers, however, were critical of American Banker’s glowing coverage 
of charge account programs, especially in the early 1950s when the leading “pioneer” firms were 
eagerly franchising charge account systems. Lorenz, though, would not be dissuaded. “We are 
also accused of ‘selling’ charge account banking. Perhaps we are,” he admitted. Yet “we believe 
that this new banking service serves a community need—that is it is a powerful goodwill 
instrument for the bank and that it brings a great flow of collateral benefits when well and 
profitably operated.”33 Lorenz’s belief, and the information gathering it inspired, ultimately gave 
bankers like G. L. Toole the resources necessary to pursue charge account banking without 
licensing another bank’s program. Budget targets (like those in Figure 3), accounting principles, 
explanations of plan management procedures, and Lorenz’s enthusiastic boosterism all served 
                                                          
30 Lorenz and Mott-Smith, Financial Problems of Instalment Selling; Otto C. Lorenz, “From the Consumer Credit 
Desk: Charge Account Bankers Show Great Improvement,” American Banker (April 28, 1955), 7. 
31 Otto C. Lorenz; “Bank Retail Charge Account Service Volume $726,098 for May, ’53,” American Banker (June 19, 
1953), 5. 
32 Otto C. Lorenz, “21 Charge Account Bankers Show Profit for 3rd Quarter—Only None Were Out of Red Year Ago,” 
American Banker (November 30, 1955), 8. 





to open charge account banking to a wider number of firms and guide bankers over the early 
shoals their plans inevitably encountered. 
In addition to constructing a community through Lorenz’s American Banker columns, 
charge account bankers cooperated directly to solidify innovation within their banks and spread 
their innovative practices to the industry as a whole. They did so first through informal personal 
networks and then within a new national trade association that grew from those contacts. “Prior 
to March, 1954,” one banker recalled, “many of us…had been exchanging ideas and discussing 
problems, both through correspondence and during personal visits to each other’s offices.”34 
That March, at the American Bankers Association’s National Installment Credit Conference in 
Chicago, a panel on bank charge account plans sponsored by the equipment firm Danvers 
Manufacturing Company provided the spark for 24 banks from 13 states to form the Charge 
Account Bankers Association (CABA). Founded to “promote generally the interest of charge 
account banking,” CABA functioned as a clearinghouse of information about bank card plans, 
where, “as each new problem developed,” they were “discussed at length, always resolved, and a 
new procedure was born.” Through annual conferences and frequent late night phone calls 
between overworked bankers, the programs of CABA banks cohered around a common set of 
features and practices, more closely resembling Franklin National’s attempts to emulate 
department store practices than Biggins’s scrip plan (Biggins did not join CABA).35 Once charge 
account plans found a stable footing, moreover, CABA became something of a self-regulatory 
institution, promulgating standards for charge account banking programs to assure nervous 
bank management, regulators, and other stakeholders that the seemingly risky credit plans were 
in fact operating on a safe, sound basis. 
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Indeed, as Lorenz and CABA members tried to encourage their industry peers by 
assuring them that charge account banking was simply an extension of existing banking 
practices, they simultaneously sought to convince regulators that the plans should not be held to 
the same regulatory standards as traditional banking. Rather, bankers argued that their novel 
service should be evaluated like the retail firms they were emulating, which were not subject to 
the strict accounting and oversight imposed on banks. These arguments were most pressing 
when it came to charge-offs—the mandated delinquency period after which banks had to write 
non-performing loans off their books—and state interest rate limits—which strictly curtailed 
rates on bank loans but usually did not extend to retail credit. “We have been examined four 
times—once by F.D.I.C., twice by State, and once by Clearing House,” one banker complained. 
Expressing frustration at prevailing banking standards, he continued, “we believe 90 day charge 
off is impractical on retail charge accounts. I know of no retailer who acts so soon.” To help 
educate bank supervisors, who continued to enforce exacting standards throughout the 1950s, 
Lorenz urged CABA to create guidelines for charge account write-offs that supervisors could 
then apply. CABA published rules for delinquency in 1959, which some examiners agreed to 
follow, while others retained more stringent installment lending standards. “Some banks,” 
Lorenz reported, “had unhappy management” as a result.36 
As retailers shifted from charge accounts to revolving credit through the 1950s, bankers 
wanted to match this transition and with it the interest charges retailers were permitted to 
assess on their revolving accounts. States, however, uniformly restricted the rates banks could 
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charge on loans of money, often to between 6 and 12 percent, while allowing slightly higher rates 
on installment loans, like those for automobiles. On the contrary, retailers’ revolving credit 
plans fell under a legal exemption to usury laws called the time-price doctrine and were largely 
unregulated. Even when states specifically regulated retail time sales, they carried higher rates 
than were otherwise allowed for money loans. In New York, for instance, the state’s Retail Sales 
Act (1960) permitted retailers to charge 1.5 percent a month (18 percent annualized) on unpaid 
revolving credit balances. On the contrary, the Personal Loan Clause of the New York Banking 
Act restricted interest to 6 percent per year.37  
Over the long term, state interest rate restrictions would be the most important and 
contested regulatory barrier bankers faced, and an important site for political conflict over bank 
credit card plans. But in the 1950s, regulatory and supervisory negotiations happened out of 
sight, without public pronouncements or political conflict. At the national level, the Comptroller 
of the Currency determined Franklin Square’s Charge-It sales slips were valid legal documents, 
but refused to comment on whether charge accounts were a legitimate banking function or to 
issue any other public statement. State authorities were also largely silent. The one exception 
was the Division of Banks of the Department of Commerce of the State of Ohio, which made it 
clear that it would not allow bank charge account programs. “This office does not look with favor 
on this type of financing by banks,” the state’s Superintendent of Banks wrote on April 24, 1959, 
perhaps because the five banks in the state that had begun charge account plans in 1953 
discontinued them soon after.38  
Although Ohio represented an extreme case, a heavy cloud of uncertainty nevertheless 
hung over charge account banking by the mid-1950s. Most plans tended to lose money for 
several years before turning modest profits; about half of the firms that jumped into the field in 
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1953 did not wait around long enough to turn the corner.39 These banks’ losses stemmed from 
inexperience developing, staffing, and promoting retail-related services, while some bankers—
sold on the merits of charge account banking by aggressive equipment salesmen—bought more 
processing equipment, carbon forms, and card imprinters than was appropriate for their 
markets. For the next several years the charge account banking “fraternity” endured a slow 
attrition. Few new banks started plans, likely as much a consequence of the booming business 
climate that prevailed from 1954 to 1957, which ensured safe, profitable outlets for bank funds, 
as of the jaundiced eye many bankers still cast on direct consumer lending.40  
The industry, though, followed the retail lending experiments closely. California’s giant 
Bank of America, which had drafted then shelved a “BankAmerica Charge-It Plan” in 1953, 
waited watchfully on the sidelines.41 Other bankers continued to read Lorenz’s columns and to 
visit, explore, and enjoy the hospitality of their CABA peers. If charge accounts were at all likely 
to develop into a successful service, as practitioners like G. L. Toole predicted, their competitors 
did not want to be left behind. 
 
The Merchant Approach 
The charge account banking plans that remained grew significantly in the 1950s, with the 
“pioneers” making gains in accounts, credit volume, and over-all profits (Appendix A). As 
importantly, through Lorenz’s columns and CABA gatherings, early practitioners solidified their 
merchant-centered model of unsecured retail credit. The merchant approach, rooted in 
commercial bankers’ business-lending expertise and wrapped rhetorically in antimonopoly 
retail politics, seemed to offer bankers not only profitable retail lending opportunities, but also 
conduits to deepen business relationships with member merchants. Yet, the merchant approach 
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had limits, too. Bankers’ choice to place the costs of charge accounts entirely on their merchant 
partners restricted their programs’ potential reach, while the geographic boundaries of 
commercial banking placed spatial limits on charge account plans. And by inserting themselves 
into the eddies of retail politics, bankers, though they came as saviors, often met forceful and 
unexpected resistance.42   
Charge account plans, bankers were eager to point out, offered a host of benefits to 
participating merchants. The first should have been obvious. As the Pan American Bank of 
Miami, Florida, explained in a brochure, “Mr. Merchant: Here’s a New Avenue of Revenue!,” its 
Charge Plan “enables the local merchant to offer his customers a charge-account service 
comparable to that of a large department store...and actually costs the consumer less!” In case 
Miami merchants were unclear on the full advantages of such a service, Pan American explained 
further that its plan would increase their base of potential customers, increase sales, and 
ultimately generate higher profits. Merchants received immediate cash for all their charge 
account sales, the bank continued, and did not risk any credit losses. Charge account plans also 
decreased bookkeeping, personnel, postage, and supply costs, bankers claimed, while allowing 
merchants to focus on what they did best—merchandising. Summing up these advantages, the 
Florida National Bank of Orlando explained that its “F.N.B. Charge Plan Acts as the Credit, 
Accounting, Bookkeeping, and Collection Departments, And Actually costs participating 
merchants and professional men, and their customers less.”43  
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Merchants would have to pay for these services, of course, and they did so through the 
merchant discount. Discounts are effectively interest in reverse, paid upfront instead of over 
time. Bankers thought of charge accounts as they did their other installment credit 
arrangements: They were purchasing a debt contracted between the merchant and the 
consumer, discounting the debt to cover the bank’s costs and provide the bank’s profit. The 
discount, in this way, compensated the bank for the time it took to collect the balance, the cost of 
administering the account, and the risk associated with the transaction. Importantly, bankers 
purchased these contracts on a non-recourse basis, meaning if the customer failed to pay their 
debts, the bank could not pass the losses back to the retailer. Put another way: bank charge 
account plans saved Mrs. Housewife the hassle of writing small checks for her monthly 
purchases, and the bank assumed the risk that the big check she wrote at the end of the month 
wouldn’t bounce. Assuming this risk, and with it the cost of tying up capital in outstanding 
consumer loans, was the core of charge account bankers’ larger effort to help merchants 
competitively offer credit. 
Initially, merchant discounts were high. While John C. Biggins claimed his Charg-It plan 
“doesn’t cost” consumers “a penny more” than purchasing with cash, merchants handed over 8 
percent of their Charg-It sales. Franklin National’s plan was less expensive, charging merchants 
5 percent on 30-day charge purchases and 6 percent on 60-day charges. Indeed, as plans later 
allowed consumers to spread their charge account payments over 30, 60, or 90 days, many 
banks raised the merchant discount on longer charges instead of assessing the consumer an 
interest charge. Lorenz tried to convince banks to push these discounts even higher, arguing that 
merchants needed to pay the full cost of this helpful credit service. In reality, banks would 
eventually reduce their merchant discounts, first by rebating merchants if they met certain sales 
volume targets, and later across the board as banks relied more on consumer interest payments 
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for revenues. Still, in charge account banking, consumers borrowed and retailers paid the 
interest.44  
For many bankers, especially smaller banks eager to win local market share, the 
relationships charge account plans generated with merchant customers brought subsidiary 
benefits which could be as important as their interest income. Participating merchants opened 
and maintained checking accounts at their charge account bank, where the bank deposited the 
merchant’s daily sales. These accounts, which by law paid no interest, served as a direct funding 
source for bankers’ outstanding charge account loans. Or, as Lorenz argued, “The charge 
account banking business finances itself.” Further, by deepening existing merchant relationships 
and especially by creating new ones, charge accounts enabled banks to promote other services, 
including commercial and mortgage loans, to their merchant customers.45  
Although bankers imagined charge accounts as a mutually beneficial service that allowed 
them to cultivate close relationships with community retailers, they were surprised to find many 
retailers undecided about the merits of charge account banking. “Strange as it may seem,” 
Franklin Square’s Donohue remarked, “the merchant requires a good deal of education in this 
program.” One problem for banks was that the merchant was getting a good deal of education 
from their trade publications, but not of a character favorable to banks. “Granting credit on 
credit cards issued by others,” Credit World bluntly warned its readers in September 1953, “is a 
mistake.”46 Many merchants, understandably hung up on the high cost, doubtlessly agreed. The 
fees charged by banks, argued NRGDA’s Credit Management Division manager A.L. Trotta, were 
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significantly higher than the cost of managing an in-house credit department. For efficient 
department stores, credit cost averaged about 2 percent of charge volume versus the 5 percent 
asked by banks. Bankers, of course, disputed these figures, and tried to convince merchants that 
offering credit would increase their average sales over-and-above the cost of the discount. For 
merchants without existing credit departments, Trotta conceded, a bank’s charge plan might be 
an appealing alternative to the initial investment in equipment and personnel, but the merchant 
would need to promote credit purchases, turning potential cash sales into 5 percent markups.47  
High merchant discounts also restricted the types of retailers banks could target for 
charge account services to those who likewise charged high markups on their merchandise. 
Clothing and shoe stores, which competed directly against expanding department stores, were 
obvious targets. Drug stores and hardware stores also often joined charge account plans, as well 
as gas and service stations. Florists and photographers too were often represented, as well as 
optometrists and dentists. In some small towns, local department stores also joined charge 
account plans, but they often negotiated much lower merchant discounts, giving the bank high 
sales volume but little added revenue.48  
More often, department stores, with their own established credit plans, were unlikely 
prospects for charge account banking, nor were discount stores that offered low prices and no 
credit. Grocers, especially supermarkets that also sold on low margins, were also unlikely to 
adopt bank card plans in the 1950s. An in-depth analysis performed by the Department of 
Agriculture in 1960 suggested that the first grocery store to join a bank plan might increase its 
profit if the store pulled sufficient business away from its competitors. This opportunity for 
profit, however, would likely pull in all the city’s other grocers. The benefits of gaining new 
                                                          
47 A. L. Trotta, “Bank Charge Account Plans: An Analysis of a New Type of Centralized Credit,” Stores (March 1953): 
19. 
48 First National Bank and Trust of Kalamazoo, “First National Charge Account Service Shoppers Guide,” First 
National Bank and Trust of Kalamazoo Clipping File, Kalamazoo Public Library; Northwestern Banks, “Directory of 
NWCP Members,” box 8, Northwest Bancorporation Records; “Clothing Stores Lean ‘Handy-Charge’ Outlets For 




customers would be eliminated, and all the grocers would be stuck paying high merchant 
discounts to banks, costs that would either subtract from profits or lead to higher consumer 
prices. This was exactly the kind of credit trap retailers were eager to avoid.49  
High costs were just one reason retailers resisted charge account programs: They also 
worried about banks intervening in their relationships with customers. Instead of returning to 
the store each month to settle their accounts, and perhaps make additional purchases, 
customers paid off their charge accounts at the bank or by mail, costing the smaller store 
valuable foot traffic. Merchants also feared that by sending their accounts to the bank, they 
would lose their customers to competitors who also adopted the bank’s charge plan. Some 
banks, like Marine Midland, a banking group in upstate New York, tried to counter this fear by 
enrolling only one type of retailer in a particular location, like a new shopping plaza. Some 
merchants took matters into their own hands, sending their more troublesome credit accounts 
to the bank, while keeping their prompt-paying customers for themselves.50  
Throughout the 1950s, the retail trade press remained suspicious of bankers’ retail credit 
plans, and many of the concerns expressed when banks rushed into the field in 1953 continued 
to be repeated throughout the decade. The same spirit of independent proprietorship that fueled 
retailers’ impulse toward anti-monopoly also led them to resist what one writer in Women’s 
Wear Daily called banks’ “long-range…campaign to establish themselves as the principal source 
for all types of credit.”51 In spite of these on-going tensions, banks were nevertheless successful 
at convincing merchants to join their plans. Between June 1953 and November 1958, the 
number of merchants accepting bank charge plans rose from 5,000 to 12,000, or from about 170 
to about 360 merchants for each reporting bank. Merchants wanted to be able to offer credit, 
                                                          
49 Townshend-Zellner, “The Bank-Charge-Account Plan and Retail Food Marketing.”  
50 Trotta, “Bank Charge Account Plans;” “Florida National Starts Charge Account Plan, Careful Preparation Features 
Bank Operation;” D. A. Freeth, “What’s Wrong with Midland Charge Plan? One Man’s Opinion Concerning the Ills 
which Plague this New Banking Service and a Few Remedial Suggestions,” March 1962, Folder NA0339-1619, HSBC 
Archives, Brooklyn, NY. 
51 “Smaller Stores Find Favor in Charge Plans,” Women’s Wear Daily (January 25, 1954); Lloyd Schwartz, “Store 
Criticism Aimed at Bank Credit Drives,” Women’s Wear Daily (May 12, 1959); Samuel Feinberg, “From Where I Sit: 




and although charge account banking had drawbacks, these plans allowed merchants to 
participate in the expansion of the private credit economy without investing heavily in the 
infrastructure necessary to do so on their own.52  
Through the 1950s, bankers also made good on their promises to unite merchants into 
local shopping communities, a process often manifested in the spatial strategies banks adopted 
to serve their specific local markets. Some charge account plans were geared toward preserving 
and revitalizing downtown shopping. Of the 74 merchants listed in the directory of the 
Industrial Savings and Trust of Muncie, Indiana, with identifiable locations, 54 were clustered 
within four blocks of the main downtown intersection, where the bank too had its offices. In 
small towns, especially, where the spread of automobile ownership placed local merchants in 
competition with large stores in nearby cities, charge accounts offered a way to keep retail 
business local. After explaining how the new 4-lane highway created “the tendency…for the 
ladies to go to Indianapolis to shop,” Columbus, Indiana, banker J. Irwin Miller explained to a 
Congressional hearing how, thanks to the bank’s charge account plan, “by and large, 
business…stays in Columbus.”53  
Other banks adopted a suburban strategy for their charge account plans. Merchants who 
moved into the nation’s gleaming new shopping centers were often short on capital, and funding 
consumer credit was an unwelcome burden. Bank charge plans allowed these merchants to band 
together and create shopping center-wide credit services for their customers. Charge account 
plans that emphasized suburban shopping, however, threatened downtown merchants. As one 
Credit World author frantically warned, “banks all over the country are sponsoring new 
consolidated ‘charge account’ services, the single purpose of which is to get people to buy in the 
neighborhood instead of going ‘downtown.’” In any case, the geographic diversity of charge 
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account plans suggests that the programs were flexible and could be adapted to different retail 
environments, even as, like the banking industry more broadly, the service was geographically 
confined by regulation.54  
And geography was not an insurmountable barrier. In a preview of later networking 
strategies adopted by banks in the 1960s, some charge account bankers experimented with 
interchange, where banks in communities separated by geographic regulations participated in 
the same card plan. The first interchange system originated in 1955 when five small banks in 
rural Michigan approached the larger Citizens Commercial & Savings Bank of Flint, which 
operated a charge account plan called “Charge-O-Matic.” As a Citizens executive explained to 
American Banker in May 1966, the smaller banks wanted to offer charge account plans in their 
towns, but feared they would not be able to generate the necessary volume to make the plans 
profitable. Citizens Commercial had long-standing correspondent banking relationships with 
the banks, and its executives, sensing an opportunity to profitably deepen these ties, devised a 
cooperative interchange system that would enable them to offer charge accounts in their 
communities. First, the small banks recruited merchants in their towns, and the merchants in 
turn recommend consumers to participate in the plan. The small correspondent banks—later 
called agent banks—then handled the merchant side of the business, collecting charge slips each 
day, taking floor limit calls, and crediting merchant accounts for consumer purchases. 
Merchants, in turn, opened checking accounts with their local agent bank, and the agent bank 
also earned a portion of the merchant discount on each local charge account transaction. 
Citizens Commercial handled the consumer side, collecting the consolidated merchant slips 
from each small bank, billing the consumers, and retaining the interest they paid on their 
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accounts. “Will it work?” the Citizens Commercial executive asked rhetorically. In May 1956, “it 
[was] a little too soon to know.”55 
The banks that experimented with “correspondent charge account plans” in the 1950s 
did so to capitalize on their investments in managerial expertise and credit processing 
equipment and to expand the geographic reach of their plans beyond their immediate markets. 
For instance, both Citizens Commercial and the First National Bank and Trust of Kalamazoo, 
which began the second such plan in 1957, were located in Michigan, a state that limited branch 
banking to within a 25 mile radius of a bank’s primary office. Correspondent plans incorporated 
merchants and consumers from outside the card-issuing banks’ geographically restricted market 
areas, increasing transaction volume and lowering individual transaction costs. Still, bankers 
were careful to root their correspondent plans within their agent banks’ communities, relying on 
cross-branding to ensure that the agent bank was the prominent local face of the plan in their 
markets. While Citizens Commercial claimed its plan covered a 100-mile radius, in the small 
towns serviced by Charge-O-Matic, the program’s emblem carried the agent bank’s name in bold 
letters. Cardholders also received their Charge-O-Matic cards in a letter from the agent bank. 
The small community banks thus maintained local relationships with merchants and 
consumers, and added income as well.56  
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Figure 4 Charge-O-Matic Ad. Note the co-branding, where both First Security Bank, the smaller 
firm, and Citizens Commercial, the larger, are listed on the decal.  
Source: Charles E. Groover, “Citizens Commercial, Flint, Mich., Offers New Service to 
Correspondent Banks; Based on Charge Account Banking,” American Banker (May 29, 1956). 
 
The Consumer Question 
Although bankers had a strong sense of the spatial dimensions of their markets and how 
they would serve the need of merchants, they were slow to grapple with and understand the 
place of consumers within their charge account plans. We now think of card-issuing banks as 
intermediating between cardholders and merchants in the same way they intermediate between 
depositors and borrowers. In the 1950s, banks did not yet see the credit-card relationship this 
way. Instead, charge account plans ran directly through merchants. Banks relied on their 




was the first step, illustrated above by a cartoon promoting the First National Bank and Trust of 
Kalamazoo’s Charge Account Service (Figure 2). Mrs. Smith, who feels a charge account would 
be “more convenient” than cash, approaches a shopkeeper who mediates the entire process of 
enrolling in the bank’s charge account program. And banks’ reliance on merchants did not end 
there. At every subsequent transaction, when the consumer chose between cash, check, or 
credit, bankers needed merchants to promote their plans.57  
Merchant discretion was an enduring problem for charge account bankers. Marine 
Midland Bank group executive Douglas A. Freeth confronted it directly in a lengthy memo, 
“What’s Wrong with Midland Charge Plan?” Five of Marine Midland’s subsidiary banks had 
adopted charge account banking in the 1950s and all were losing money. For Freeth, “the heart 
of the whole problem” was “the host of merchants, of all sizes, who do not realize the value of 
credit selling or know how to accomplish it.” Without sufficient merchant buy-in, the Midland 
banks could not generate enough sales volume to cover their fixed costs. To increase charge 
volume, bank personnel had to sell merchants on the virtues of the Midland Charge plan and 
convince merchants to sell charge accounts to consumers. “We need to stimulate, through 
merchants, more card holders and increased card usage,” Freeth concluded. “Such a result will 
not just happen. It must be made to happen—by selling—hard!” This sentiment was echoed by 
other charge account bankers, who throughout the 1950s uniformly argued that bankers needed 
to convince merchants to sell on credit, not convince consumers to buy.58  
Bankers’ understanding of the role of merchants was a direct reflection of how banks 
understood consumers. First, because bankers crafted their charge account plans to help 
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merchants in their communities, they were often unable to see consumers as individuals to 
whom they could sell directly. While they imagined using charge account plans to gain new 
merchant customers in the 1950s, bankers seldom discussed how charge accounts could lead to 
new consumer deposits or generate new consumer loans. This blind spot is not surprising, since 
in their other lines of consumer credit, most banks tended to work through intermediaries, such 
as car dealers for auto loans, instead of selling credit directly to consumers. In a larger sense, 
most 1950s bankers did not feel that they could make an all-out direct pitch to consumers. As 
Freeth concluded in his report, “an individual’s attitude toward debt and his paying habits are 
not easily predetermined or readily changed.” Other bank card promoters agreed. Recall Edward 
Donohue’s exhortation that “we could not change habits.” Instead bankers needed to build their 
charge account plan on the relationships that already existed, first between consumers and 
merchants, and then between merchants and the bank.59  
The constructed identity of their ideal charge account customers—Mrs. Housewife—also 
influenced bankers’ approach to customer solicitation. Bank offices were largely male spaces and 
charge account banking was self-consciously a “fraternity.” Bank executives worked within a 
hierarchy of social and gender divisions that made men comfortable; merchants and bank tellers 
served female customers, while bankers dealt with other men. They would never be comfortable, 
to put it plainly, soliciting other men’s wives. 
Still, just because bankers did not feel they could solicit consumer participation directly 
did not mean that consumers were not active agents in the growth of charge account banking. 
After all, it was the desire by small merchants to meet the demands of their customers for credit 
facilities that drove the development of charge account banking in the first place. And so long as 
consumers were borrowing while the retailer paid the interest—so long as the costs of the system 
remained hidden from consumers through a pricing mechanism that weighed heavily on 
                                                          




merchants—consumers continued to pressure retailers to take their new bank cards. For Pan 
American Bank in Miami, “each customer [was] an ambassador of good will and usually 
demand[ed] new merchants…inquire and join this service.” Merchants, though, seldom 
appreciated this consumer arm-twisting. As Raymond Alm, a Marine Midland executive working 
independently of D. A. Freeth, discovered after surveying his bank’s merchant partners, “Most of 
these merchants did not need (or desire) this bank service, but joined the plan in order to retain 
present customers who might wish to use the bank charge card in their stores.” 60  
Bankers did increasingly rely on consumer interest payments to produce revenue, slowly 
adopting revolving credit features that allowed consumers to carry their purchases over time by 
paying an interest charge on their outstanding monthly balances. In October 1953, Lorenz 
reported that only a fifth of charge account bank plans incorporated revolving credit, “surely an 
omission of major magnitude.” As charge account bankers gained more experience, and 
reported this experience to Lorenz, he urged bankers that were not matching their peers in 
terms of income and profits to adopt revolving credit “both as a means of increasing volume and 
as another source of valuable income.” His advice was often very direct: “We would recommend 
a careful study of No. (17),” a bank employing revolving credit, “to Bank No. (19),” a bank which 
did not, “where additional income is obviously very much needed.” By August 1958, nearly 60 
percent of charge account banking plans would incorporate revolving credit.61   
Bankers, though, were not sure how to talk about or promote this credit feature, because, 
as Raymond Alm found, consumers still had significant reservations about retail credit. In 
addition to surveying Marine Midland’s merchant customers, Alm also surveyed the bank’s 
inactive cardholders “to determine their reaction to the charge plan and their reasons for not 
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using this service more often.” Alm was struck by a paradox. He found that 31.2 percent of 
inactive cardholders claimed they did not like to use credit, while only 9.8 percent reported they 
did not use charge accounts. Alm considered this “an obvious inconsistency.” Was it? Perhaps 
consumers in the throes of postwar abundance chafed at the insecurities caused by credit use 
and attendant indebtedness. Perhaps they were still culturally predisposed to abhor what in 
practice was a typical feature of modern economic life. For Alm and his Marine Midland Bank, 
the solution to this consumer resistance was simply not to talk about credit. “The economy and 
convenience of only one bill a month should be emphasized,” Alm wrote, “thus creating the 
image that the bank is performing a billing service, not a credit service.” To affect this image, 
Marine Midland renamed their Midland Shopper Credit Service the Midland Charge Plan. The 
bankers who oversaw Charge-It, Charge-Rite, and Charge-O-Matic had long been doing the 
same thing.62  
 
Conclusion: An Accounting  
In 1958, Bank of America and Chase Manhattan, the first and second largest banks in the 
United States, entered the charge account business, and eager bankers deluged Lorenz with 
questions. They wanted to know if they, too, should begin offering charge accounts, and why, 
after all, had so many banks dropped out of the business over the past few years. Lorenz 
resented these inquiries. Through his relentless promotion of charge account banking over the 
past half-decade, he felt he had clearly demonstrated the viability of charge account programs, 
and through such demonstrations, the necessity for bankers to break the confines of their 
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marble-clad imaginations and embrace progressive methods of granting credit. “Charge account 
banking stands on its own feet,” Lorenz retorted. “It is profitable.”63  
Lorenz, though, likely did not yet realize that Chase and Bank of America were offering 
two very different types of charge account plans. While Chase pursued a conventional merchant-
focused strategy in New York City, Bank of America, which operated a statewide branch network 
in California and had long pursued consumer-focused banking, instead bypassed merchants and 
mailed millions of unsolicited credit cards to its current customers. Both banks suffered large 
and unexpected losses, but Bank of America allocated many program expenses to other divisions 
of the firm, making the plan appear profitable by the early 1960s. On the other hand, Chase 
Manhattan’s rigorous accounting convinced its executives that early losses would only get worse 
and they quickly fled the business.64 By the time Bank of America began licensing its 
BankAmericard program in 1966—a strategy familiar to Biggins and Donahue—the consumer-
focused “credit card” was replacing the charge account in the banking industry’s retail credit 
imagination.  
Bank of America’s success over Chase has eclipsed the history of charge account banking, 
and with it our understanding of early postwar financial innovation. Charge account banking 
was the distinct product of the postwar financial regulatory system and the politics of retail anti-
monopolism that undergirded it. Bankers developed these systems within the confines of a 
political economy designed to constrain their firms’ geographic reach, which ultimately enabled 
them to cooperate and innovate together. But in doing so, they forged a path toward unsecured 
retail lending that would soon become crowded with larger banks.  
Though beyond the immediate scope of this essay, charge account banks were 
nevertheless active participants in this transition. Douglas Freeth, who surveyed Midland’s 
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Shoppers Charge Plan in 1962, led the consortium of bankers who formed the Interbank Card 
Association in 1966, the nationwide rival to Bank of America’s BankAmericard. Interbank 
members eventually issued cards under the brand Master Charge (not, of course, Master 
Credit).65 The First National Bank of Omaha, a member of the 1953 wave of charge account 
banks66, was the defendant in a series of federal cases that led eventually to the Marquette 
decision (1978), in which the Supreme Court determined that a national bank could assess 
interest on credit card accounts based on the laws of the state in which it was located. The case 
law First of Omaha’s lawyers developed through the 1970s served as the foundation for banks to 
construct regional and then nationwide credit card plans, and eventually to engage in regulatory 
arbitrage by locating these plans in states like South Dakota and Delaware. Securitization 
followed immediately thereafter.67 
Grasping the longer history of charge account banking helps us better understand how 
the postwar political structure shaped bankers’ business strategies as they sought new ways to 
profitably underwrite consumer abundance. Viewing subsequent developments through the lens 
of these experiences, in turn, demonstrates how those structures continued to shape credit 
development. After all, the same postwar political economy confined Bank of America within the 
state of California. When the firm sought to build on its statewide success and develop a national 
card network in the mid-1960s, its executives adopted the interchange agreements first 
developed by Citizens Commercial to cross state lines. Even as the BankAmericard went 
national, geographic regulatory restrictions meant that banks who joined the system signed up 
merchants and issued cards in their communities. Local embeddedness remained an essential 
feature of bank credit card plans into the 1970s. Bankers continued to judge the success of their 
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plans by the consumer and merchant relationships they generated, not simply by the interest 
income they produced.  
The economic shocks of the 1970s certainly compelled bankers, merchants, and 
consumers to all alter their strategies in ways that remade the financial economy in the United 
States. Yet the trends that we now characterize as financialization were deeply rooted. In the 
case of universal bank credit cards, they emerged from the efforts of bankers like G. L. Tool to 







Appendix A: Growth of Charge Account Banking Plans, 1954-1958 
 
 
Source: American Banker Quarterly Charge Account Banking Reports. All figures as reported 














1954Q1 42 $4,482  $3,843  8,304 485.8 
1954Q2 38 $5,906  $4,546  8,068 496.2 
1954Q3 38 $5,035  $4,257  8,905 497.6 
1954Q4 41 $9,134  $7,324  9,936 530.1 
1955Q1 42 $6,760  $5,973  9,455 590.2 
1955Q2 43 $8,902  $6,991  10,500 625.2 
1955Q3 44 $8,026  $7,030  11,396 659.5 
1955Q4 41 $12,822  $10,953  10,915 826 
1956Q1 41 $9,172  $8,821  11,510 620 
1956Q2 39 $10,524  $9,139  11,383 651.6 
1956Q3 40 $9,157  $8,660  11,630 674.3 
1956Q4 40 $13,464  $12,059  11,903 687.5 
1957Q1 35 $7,850  $8,259  10,918 594.5 
1957Q2 35 $10,140  $9,192  10,586 645.7 
1957Q3 35 $9,270  $9,104  11,147 707.9 
1957Q4 34 $13,135  $12,496  11,357 754 
1958Q1 34 $8,585  $10,053  11,565 748.9 
1958Q2 34 $10,397  $10,211  11,895 756.8 
1958Q3 33 $9,291  $9,487  12,097 716.6 
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